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We extend the Open Games framework for compositional game theory to
encompass also mixed strategies, making essential use of the discrete prob-
ability distribution monad. We show that the resulting games form a sym-
metric monoidal category, which can be used to compose probabilistic games
in parallel and sequentially. We also consider morphisms between games,
and show that intuitive constructions give rise to functors and adjunctions
between pure and probabilistic open games.
1 Introduction
The research project of open games aims to re-develop the foundations of economic
game theory using compositionality and category theory [Hed16], building on e.g. the
work of Escardó and Oliva [EO10]. A compositional framework was proposed by Ghani
et al. [Gha+18b], which included operators from which to build games from smaller
component games, and solution concepts such as pure Nash equilibria. However many
games that can be found even early on in an undergraduate textbook on game theory
(such as e.g. Leyton-Brown and Shoham [LBS08]) fail to contain any equilibria, un-
less probabilistic (so-called mixed) strategies are allowed. In contrast, already Nash
[Nas51] proves that mixed strategy Nash equilibria always exist for games with a nite
number of players and strategies.
In this work, we extend the framework of open games also to mixed strategies.
We use the discrete probability distribution monad on Set (a baby version of the Giry
monad [Gir82]) to incorporate probability distributions. However simply moving to
the Kleisli category for this monad is not sucient for our purposes, as that would fail
to capture mixed strategies without also demanding e.g. probabilistic play functions.
Instead, wemake sure to enrich the framework of open games withmeasured use of the
distribution monad in the appropriate places. In particular, we construct a “relational
Kleisli lifting”, a variant of the relational lifting for set functors (cf. e.g. Kupke, Kurz,
and Venema [KKV12]), that turns predicates with non-probabilistic parameters into
predicates with mixed parameters in a non-trivial way.
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2 Compositional Game Theory with Pure Strategies
We briey recall the denition of non-probabilistic, “pure” open games as introduced
by Hedges [Hed16] for modelling economic game theory with deterministic agents.
Definition 1. Let X, Y , R and S be sets. A pure open game G = (ΣG , PG , CG , EG) : (X,S) −→
(Y,R) consists of:
• a set ΣG, called the set of strategy proles of G,
• a function PG : ΣG ×X → Y , called the play function of G,
• a function CG : ΣG ×X ×R→ S, called the coutility function of G, and
• a function EG : X × (Y → R)→P(ΣG), called the equilibrium function of G. 
As these games are open, they have an interface for interacting with other games. This
consists of a setX representing the state/history of the game, a set Y of possiblemoves,
a set R of possible outcomes, and a set S of possible outcomes to feed back to the
environment. Open games also have a strategy set ΣG fromwhich we wish to determine
the optimal strategy. The play function PG produces a move based on the state and
strategy. The coutility function CG then determines which outcome is returned to the
environment based on the state, strategy and outcome, and the equilibrium function
EG determines which strategies are optimal given the state and utility function. See
Example 4 on the next page for an example. The game given there is probabilistic, but
as we will see, most of the structure is shared between pure and probabilistic games.
The following fundamental theorem of pure open games allows parallel and se-
quential composition:
Theorem 2 (Ghani et al. [Gha+18b]) The collection of pairs (X,S) of sets X and S, with pure
open games G : (X,S) −→ (Y,R) as morphisms, forms a symmetric monoidal category GPure.
To be precise, in order to satisfy the category axioms on the nose, one needs to quo-
tient by the equivalence relation induced by isomorphism of strategies. We simplify
presentation here and in what follows by dealing with representatives directly.
3 Probabilistic Open Games
Our aim is to extend the framework of compositional game theory to also encompass
mixed strategies, i.e. games where players’ strategies are probability distributions over
pure strategies. For a set X, write D(X) for the set of discrete probability distributions
on X, i.e. D(X) is the collection of functions ω : X → [0, 1] with ∑x∈X ω(x) = 1 whose
support supp(ω) = {x ∈ X | ω(x) 6= 0} is nite. It is well known that D : Set → Set is
a monad (see e.g. Jacobs [Jac18] for an overview of probability monads in dierent
categories), and we will make essential use of this structure in the following. The unit
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of the monad η : X → DX maps elements to point distributions, and the multiplication
µ : D2X → DX “attens” a distribution of distributions. Furthermore, D is a commu-
tative strong monad, meaning that there is a double strength natural transformation
` : DA×DB → D(A×B) given by forming the independent joint distribution. Algebras
of D are convex sets, which we think of as sets R equipped with the operation of taking
expected values E : D(R)→ R. We do not expect all sets involved in a game to support
this operation — e.g. the set of moves is typically discrete — but we do expect (and
need) the sets of possible outcomes for the games and its environment to do so.
Definition 3. Let X, Y be sets, and R, S be D-algebras. A probabilistic open game G =
(ΣG , PG , CG , EG) : (X,S) −→ (Y,R) consists of:
• a set ΣG, called the set of strategy proles of G,
• a function PG : ΣG ×X → Y , called the play function of G,
• a function CG : ΣG ×X ×R→ S, called the coutility function of G, and
• a function EG : X × (Y → R)→P(D(ΣG)), called the equilibrium function of G. 
In other words, a probabilistic open game consists of the same data as a pure open
game, except that the equilibrium function records which mixed strategies are “opti-
mal”, instead of just being concerned with pure strategies. Overall, this matches how
we usually think of games with mixed strategies: the moves and outcomes of the game
stays the same, only the strategies can be probabilistic. The D-algebra structure of R
and S is not needed for this basic denition, but will be used to compose games.
H T
H −1, 1 1,−1
T 1,−1 −1, 1
Figure 1: Utility k of the Matching Pennies game.
Example 4. The Matching Pennies game involves two players trying to win pennies
from each other. Each player puts forward one side of a penny, heads or tails. If the
faces match then the rst player wins the second player’s penny, and if they do not
match, the second player instead wins the rst player’s penny. This is summarised in
Figure 1. We can represent Matching Pennies as a state-free open game
MP : (1,R× R) −→ ({H,T} × {H,T},R× R)
with utility and coutility taken from R×R, and moves Y ×Y where Y = {H,T}— each
player either plays heads or tails. A pure strategy is simply a move (i.e. the strategy
set for the game is ΣMP = Y ×Y ), hence both the play and coutility functions PMP and
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CMP are particularly simple, given by PMP(c) = c and CMP(c, r) = r respectively. The
equilibrium EMP : (Y × Y → R× R)→P(D(ΣMP)) is dened by φ ∈ EMP k if and only if
φ1 ∈ arg max
φ′1∈DY
(E[D(λy .E[D(pi1k(y ,−))φ2])φ′1])
and φ2 ∈ arg max
φ′2∈DY
(E[D(λy′.E[D(pi2k(−, y′))φ1])φ′2])
where φi = D(pii)φ are the marginals of φ. We see that both players are trying to max-
imise their expected payo, assuming their opponent probabilistically plays according
to their xed strategy. •◦
4 Probabilistic Open Games Form a Symmetric Monoidal Category
Just like pure open games, probabilistic open games support a wide range of opera-
tions: they can be composed in parallel, composed sequentially, conditioned, iterated,
and much more. Here we focus on parallel and sequential composition, and prove that
these operations make the collection of pairs of sets with probabilistic open games as
morphisms a symmetric monoidal category.
4.1 Parallel composition of probabilistic open games
The parallel composition represents two games played simultaneously. Its denition
makes crucial use of the fact that the category of D-algebras has all limits, since it
employs products of D-algebras R×R′ and S × S′.
Definition 5. Let G : (X,S) −→ (Y,R) and G′ : (X ′, S′) −→ (Y ′, R′) be probabilistic open
games. We dene the parallel composition probabilistic open game G⊗G′ : (X×X ′, S × S′) −→
(Y × Y ′, R×R′) as follows:
• the strategy set is ΣG⊗G′ = ΣG × ΣG′;
• the play function is dened by PG⊗G′((σ, σ′), (x, x′)) = (PG(σ, x), PG′(σ′, x′));
• the coutility function is dened by CG⊗G′((σ, σ′), (x, x′), (r, r′)) = (CG(σ, x, r), CG′(σ′, x′, r′));
• the equilibrium function EG⊗G′ : (X ×X ′)× (Y × Y ′ → R ×R′)→P(D(ΣG × ΣG′)) is
dened by
EG⊗G′ (x1, x2) k = { `(φ1, φ2) | φ1 ∈ EG x1 E[D(pi1 ◦ k) ◦ `(η−,D(PG′(−, x2))φ2)] ∧
φ2 ∈ EG′ x2 E[D(pi2 ◦ k) ◦ `(D(PG(−, x1)φ1), η−)] } 
The denition of the strategy set, play function and coutility function coincides
with the denition of parallel composition for pure open games, as expected. The
equilibrium function of the parallel game is more complicated because of the proba-
bilities involved — note that this makes essential use of the D-algebra structure on
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R. Basically, each player is trying to nd an equilibrium for the utility function which
computes the expected utility for the original utility function k : Y × Y ′ → R × R′, as-
suming the other player plays probabilistically using their xed strategy. Note that even
though EG⊗G′ (x1, x2) k is a predicate on D(ΣG × ΣG′), and not on D(ΣG) × D(ΣG′), only
strategies that arise independently from strategies in ΣG and ΣG′ are in the equilibrium.
Game-theoretically, this makes sense, as the players are not expected to cooperate,
and mathematically, this is crucial for parallel composition to be associative.
Example 6. In Example 4 we showed that the Matching Pennies game can be repre-
sented as a open game. We now show that we can build this game as the parallel
composition of two identical component “player” games MPi : (1,R) −→ ({H,T},R).
Strategies are moves ΣMPi = Y = {H,T} and the play function is given as the iden-
tity on strategies. The coutility is given as the second projection returning the utility.
Finally the equilibrium function EMPi : (Y → R)→P(D(ΣMPi)) is given by
φ ∈ EMPik if φ ∈ arg max(E[D(k)(−)])
i.e. a mixed strategy is optimal if it maximises the expected payo. The parallel com-
position ofMP1 andMP2 produces theMatching Pennies game described in Example 4
MP1 ⊗MP2 ∼=MP .
The equilibrium function for the composed game states that φ ∈ EMP1⊗MP2 k if
φ1 ∈ EMP1(λy .E[D(pi1 ◦ k)`(η(y) , φ2)])
and φ2 ∈ EMP2(λy′.E[D(pi2 ◦ k)`(φ1, η(y′))])
where φi = D(pii)φ are the marginals of φ.
To show that our denition gives the expected results from economic game theory,
we now solve this game, i.e. we compute a more concrete description of EMP k for the
utility function from Figure 1. As Matching Pennies is a symmetric game we focus on
the rst player’s equilibrium. Expanding the denition of EMP1, the condition says
φ1 ∈ arg max
φ′1∈DΣ
(E[D(λy.E[D(pi1 ◦ k)`(η(y), φ2)])φ′1])
The vigilant reader might have noticed that the equilibrium condition here is not
syntactically the same as the one given in Example 4, but because of the point dis-
tributions η(y) involved, it is not hard to see that the expressions are equal. Reducing
the terms down and instantiating the utility function from Figure 1, we reach
φ1 ∈ arg max
φ′1∈DΣ
(
∑
r∈R
r
∑
{y∈Y |φ2(y)−φ2(y¯)=r}
φ′1(y))
As there are only two pure strategies, we can consider both possibilities for φ2 in terms
of φ2(H) only:
φ2(H)− φ2(T ) = φ2(H)− (1− φ2(H)) φ2(T )− φ2(H) = (1− φ2(H))− φ2(H)
= 2φ2(H)− 1 = 1− 2φ2(H)
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Rearranging and substituting into the formula, we arrive at the condition
φ1 ∈ arg max
φ′
((2φ2(H)− 1)(2φ′(H)− 1))
and since the game is symmetric we similarly obtain for the second player
φ2 ∈ arg max
φ′′
((2φ1(H)− 1)(1− 2φ′′(H)))
leaving three cases to consider:
if φ2(H) = 1/2 ⇒ φ1(H) ∈ [0, 1] φ1(H) = 1/2 ⇒ φ2(H) ∈ [0, 1]
φ2(H) < 1/2 ⇒ φ1(H) = 0 φ1(H) < 1/2 ⇒ φ2(H) = 1
φ2(H) > 1/2 ⇒ φ1(H) = 1 φ1(H) > 1/2 ⇒ φ2(H) = 0
The only point of stability lies at φ1(H) = φ2(H) = 1/2, since if one player deviates from
this strategy the other will return the favour. Hence the only equilibrium is for both
players to play both strategies with 50% probability, indeed the standard solution. •◦
In order to prove associativity of parallel composition, we use a “determinisation”
construction that turns probabilistic games into pure games, reminiscent of the ab-
stract categorical formulation of automata determinisation presented e.g. in Silva et
al. [Sil+13]. This way, we can reuse part of the proof that parallel composition is
associative for pure games [Gha+18b].
Definition 7. Given a probabilistic game G : (X,S) −→ (Y,R) with strategy set Σ, we
dene its determinisation pure game ∆(G) : (X,S) −→ (DY,DR) with strategy set DΣ and
• play function P∆(G)(φ, x) = D(PG(−, x))φ;
• coutility function C∆(G)(φ, x, ψ) = E[D(CG(−, x,−))`(φ, ψ)]; and
• equilibrium function φ ∈ E∆(G) x k if and only if φ ∈ EG x (E ◦ k ◦ η). 
Using the naturality of η, and that E : D(R)→ R is a D-algebra, it is easy to see the
following way to go between the equilibria of G and ∆(G):
Lemma 8 Let k : Y → R. Then φ ∈ E∆(G) x D(k) if and only if φ ∈ EG x k.
In general, it is not the case that the determinisation of a parallel composition is
a parallel composition of determinisations — for instance, the type of moves do not
even match up, since in general D(Y × Y ′) 6∼= DY ×DY ′. To obtain even a lax monoidal
map ∆(G) ⊗∆(G′) → ∆(G ⊗ G′), we need to restrict to utility functions that respect the
D-algebra structure, which for instance Kleisli extensions do. This is formulated in
the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Let G : (X,S) −→ (Y,R) and G′ : (X ′, S′) −→ (Y ′, R′) be probabilistic open games.
For all φ ∈ DΣG ×DΣG′ , x ∈ X ×X ′, and k : Y × Y ′ → D(R×R′), we have
`(φ) ∈ E∆(G⊗G′) x k# i φ ∈ E∆(G)⊗∆(G′) x (〈D(pi1),D(pi2)〉 ◦ k# ◦ `)
where k# = µ ◦ D(k) : D(Y × Y ′)→ D(R×R′) is the Kleisli extension of k.
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We use this lemma to prove the associativity of parallel composition of probabilistic
games using the corresponding associativity for pure games.
Theorem 10 Let G : (X,S) −→ (Y,R), G′ : (X ′, S′) −→ (Y ′, R′) and G′′ : (X ′′, S′′) −→ (Y ′′, R′′)
be probabilistic open games. WehaveG⊗(G′⊗G′′) = (G⊗G′)⊗G′′, up to canonical isomorphisms
A× (A′ ×A′′) ∼= (A×A′)×A′′ of the underlying sets involved.
4.2 Sequential composition of probabilistic open games
Another fundamental operation to modularly build games is sequential composition.
Intuitively, in the sequential composition G #H of open games G and H, we rst play G,
followed by H. This means the moves of G are the states of H, and pure strategies of
G #H are pairs of pure strategies for G and H. A mixed strategy φ of the composed game
G #H is an equilibrium if the marginal distributions are equilibria in G (relative to the
payo function for G that we obtain by feeding H’s coutility back) and H (relative to
the given payo function of G # H), respectively. In order to state the latter, we rst
need to dene a “Kleisli predicate lifting” of EH(−, k) : Y →P(D(ΣH)), since we only
get a mixed state in D(Y ) as a result of probabilistically playing the rst game using
the rst mixed strategy.
Definition 11. Let R : X → P(D(Y )). We dene D#(R) : D(X) → P(D(Y )) by D#(R) =
P(µY ) ◦ λD(Y ) ◦ D(R), where λ : DP→PD is the transformation given by
λX(α) = {φ ∈ DX|
(∃ρ ∈ D(∈⊆ X ×PX))(D(pi1)ρ = φ and D(pi2)ρ = α)} . 
Concretely, for α = ∑i pixi ∈ D(X), we have
D#(R)(α) = {µ(
∑
i
∑
j
qi,jψi,j) |
∑
j
qi,j = pi and ψi,j ∈ R(xi)}
where ∑i piφi is the distribution on Y assigning probability ∑i piφi(y) to y ∈ Y . By the
abstract denition, we immediately have thatD#(R◦f) = D#(R)◦D(f) sinceD is a functor.
We now use this lifting to dene the sequential composition of two probabilistic games.
Definition 12. Let G : (X,S) −→ (Y,R) and H : (Y,R) −→ (Z, T ) be probabilistic open
games. We dene the sequential composition probabilistic open game G #H : (X,S) −→
(Z, T ) as follows:
• the strategy set is ΣG#H = ΣG × ΣH;
• the play function is dened by PG#H((σ1, σ2), x) = PH(σ2, PG(σ1, x));
• the coutility function is dened by CG#H((σ1, σ2), x, t) = CG(σ1, x, CH(σ2, PG(σ1, x), t));
• the equilibrium function EG#H : X × (Z → T )→P(D(ΣG × ΣH)) is dened by
EG#H x k = { `(φ1, φ2) | φ1 ∈ EG x (λy.E[D(λσ.CH(σ, y, k(PH(σ, y))))φ2]) ∧
φ2 ∈ D#(EH(−, k)) (D(PG(−, x))φ1)} 
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Figure 2: Market Entry game: firms 1 and 2 decide whether to enter (σE) or not enter (σNE) the market.
To see that this denition is meaningful game-theoretically, we model the well-
known Market Entry game (Stackelberg [Sta34]) using our framework.
Example 13. The market entry game models two competing rms wishing to enter a
new market. If they both enter, the competition between them would be expensive.
The situation is depicted in Figure 2. Firm 1 enters rst, rm 2 then observes the
move made and responds. If one rm enters alone they will reap the rewards, but if
both enter they will both suer. Of course if neither enters then nothing happens. We
expect the only subgame perfect equilibrium to be where the rst rm enters, and the
second rm reverses the rst rm’s decision.
We model this as a sequential composition G1 # G2 of two probabilistic open games.
The rst game G1 : (1,R× R) −→ ({σE , σNE},R× R) has strategy set Σ1 = Y = {σE , σNE}
the set of moves, and the obvious play and coutility functions. Its equilibria are
E1 (k : Y → R× R) = arg max
φ∈DΣ1
{E[D(pi1 ◦ k)(φ)]}
The second game G2 : ({σE , σNE},R× R) −→ (Y × Y,R× R) arises as a “subgame condi-
tioned” game [Gha+18a, Def. 5] in order to allow the strategies Σ2 = Y → Σ1 to depend
on the move made in G1. The play and coutility functions are given by P2(g, x) = (x, g(x))
and C2(g, x, r) = r. The equilibrium function insists on subgame perfect strategies:
ψ ∈ E2 y (k : Y × Y → R× R) i (∀y′ ∈ Y ) D(eval(−, y′))ψ ∈ arg max
ψ′∈DΣ1
{E[D(pi2 ◦ k(y′,−))(ψ′)]}
where eval : (A→ B)×A→ B is function evaluation.
The sequential composition G1 # G2 : (1,R × R) −→ (Y × Y,R × R) has as strategies
pairs of strategies from each round ΣG1#G2 = Σ1 ×Σ2. For mixed strategies φ ∈ DΣ1 and
ψ ∈ DΣ2, we have `(φ, ψ) ∈ EG1#G2 (k : Y × Y → R× R) if and only if
φ ∈ E1 (λy.E[D(λf. k(y, f(y)))ψ]) and
ψ ∈ D#(E2(−, k))φ = D(E2(σE , k)) = D(E2(σNE , k))
where the second condition has been simplied since E2(y, k) is independent of y. For
the utility function k from Figure 2, we further see that in fact E2(σE , k) = E2(σNE , k) =
{1 · swap} where swap : Y → Y is the function which swaps σE and σNE. Hence for
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`(φ, ψ) ∈ EG1#G2 k we must have ψ = 1 · swap which in turns forces φ = 1 · σE — the
expected (non-mixed) subgame perfect equilibria. Reecting on the argument, we
see that our reasoning is an instance of backward induction (see e.g. Leyton-Brown
and Shoham [LBS08, §4.4]). It is interesting, but currently not clear to us, what the
D#(−) construction does in general when the second game has not been conditioned to
respond to the moves of the rst game. •◦
It is important to note that the distributive law λ : DP→PD used in Denition 11 is
not a distributive law betweenmonads, because no such law exists (Zwart and Marsden
[ZM18]). In particular, λ does not preserve the monad structure of D, for instance
λX ◦ ηPX 6= ηPDX . It is however a distributive law between functors (even of a functor
over the monadP, and also overPop, although we do not make use of this fact), which
will be important for us for proving associativity of sequential composition.
Fact 14 The transformation λ : DP → PD is is a distributive law between functors, i.e. it is
natural.
For a proof see Kupke, Kurz, and Venema [KKV12]. Using the naturality of λ, we can
show that if R : X →PDY and f : DY → DY ′, thenP(f)◦D#(R) = D#(P(f)◦R). This, with
f being a marginal D(pi), is one of the key steps to prove associativity of composition.
Theorem 15 Let G : (X,S) −→ (X ′, S′), G′ : (X ′, S′) −→ (X ′′, S′′) and G′′ : (X ′′, S′′) −→ (Y,R)
be probabilistic open games. We have G #(G′ #G′′) = (G #G′)#G′′, up to the canonical isomorphism
ΣG × (ΣG′ × ΣG′′) ∼= (ΣG × ΣG′)× ΣG′′ of strategy sets.
4.3 A symmetric monoidal category
We have now assembled most of pieces needed to show that probabilistic open games
are the morphisms of a monoidal category: missing are unit and identity games.
For each set X and D-algebra S, we dene a probabilistic open game ID(X,S) :
(X,S) −→ (X,S) with strategy set ΣID(X,S) = 1, play function PID(X,S)(σ, x) = x, coutility
function CID(X,S)(σ, x, s) = s, and equilibrium function EID(X,S) x k = 1, i.e. every (trivial)
strategy is an equilibrium.
Lemma 16 There is a categoryGProb, where objects are pairs (X,S)of a setX andaD-algebraS,
and morphisms are probabilistic open games. Composition is given by sequential composition
G ◦ H = H # G, and the identity on (X,S) is ID(X,S).
Similarly, we dene a trivial game I : (1,1) −→ (1,1) with strategy set ΣI = 1, the
only possible play and coutility functions, and equilibrium function EI x k = 1, i.e.
every strategy is again an equilibrium.
Lemma 17 The game I is the unit for parallel composition. Furthermore, the operation which
maps (X,S) and (X ′, S′) to (X ×X ′, S × S′), and games G and G′ to G ⊗ G′, denes a bifunctor
⊗ : GProb × GProb → GProb.
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Observing that GProb also has a symmetry (inherited from Set × (D-Alg)op), we have
now proved the following:
Theorem 18 The collection of pairs (X,S) of a setX and aD-algebra S, with probabilistic open
games G : (X,S) −→ (Y,R) as morphisms, forms a symmetric monoidal category GProb.
5 Relating pure and probabilistic games
We now construct a category where probabilistic open games are the objects, by den-
ing a notion of morphism between games. In light of Theorem 18, these morphisms are
2-cells in a monoidal double category of games (cf. Hedges [Hed18]). The construction
works similarly for pure games. We then use the resulting categorical structure to re-
late pure and probabilistic games in the form of an adjunction between the categories.
As noticed by Ghani et al. [Gha+18b], the denition of pure open games can be
given more compactly by employing the language of lenses [Fos+07]. A lens (v, u) :
(X,S) → (Y,R) between pairs of sets (X,S) and (Y,R) is given by a two functions
v : X → Y (“view”) and u : X × R → S (“update”). Hence the play and coutility
functions of a game G : (X,S) −→ (Y,R) can equivalently be described as a family of
lenses (PG(σ,−), CG(σ,−,−)) : (X,S) → (Y,R) indexed by strategies σ ∈ ΣG. Further, the
data involved in the equilibrium function can be described by a “global element” lens
(1,1)→ (X,S) and a “global co-element” lens (Y,R)→ (1,1). As a result, most reason-
ing about open games can be done diagrammatically using that lenses also compose:
given (v, u) : (X,S) → (Y ′, R′) and (v′, u′) : (Y ′, R′) → (Y,R), we can construct a lens
(X,S)→ (Y,R) by (v′ ◦ v : X → Y, (x, y) 7→ u(x, u′(v(x), y)) : X × Y → R).
There is an identity-on-objects functor ι(−,−) : Set × Setop → Lens that maps a
pair of functions (f : X → Y , g : R→ S) to a lens ι(f, g) : (X,S) → (Y,R) with f as rst
component and g ◦ pi2 : X ×R→ S as second component.
Definition 19. Let G : (X,S) −→ (Y,R) and G′ : (X ′, S′) −→ (Y ′, R′) be pure (probabilistic)
open games. A morphism of pure (probabilistic) games G → G′ consists of functions
(fP : X → X ′, fC : S′ → S) (gP : Y → Y ′, gC : R′ → R)
and h : ΣG → ΣG′, such that the following diagram of lenses commutes for each σ ∈ ΣG
(X,S)
ι(fP ,fC)//
(PG(σ),CG(σ))

(X ′, S′)
(PG′ (h(σ)),CG′ (h(σ)))

(Y,R)
ι(gP ,gC)
// (Y ′, R′)
and, for every x ∈ X and k : Y ′ → R′, we have that σ ∈ EG x (gC ◦ k ◦ gp) implies
• h(σ) ∈ EG′ (fP (x)) k for pure games,
• D(h)(σ) ∈ EG′ (fP (x)) k for probabilistic games.
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We write GameProb and GamePure for the categories of probabilistic and pure open games,
respectively, where the morphisms are dened as above. 
This is a generalisation of the denition of morphism of state-free games used in
our paper on iterated open games [Gha+18a], but dierent from the notion of mor-
phism employed by Hedges [Hed18], which fails to make the determinisation operation
∆ from Denition 7 a functor. As there are currently a number of viable notions of
morphisms of games (even of lenses), we consider this empirical evidence important
for what an appropriate notion of morphism for games ought to be. For the rest of
this section, let Game′Pure be the category GamePure, except that utility and coutility sets
are additionally endowed with D-algebra structure.
Proposition 20 A variant of determinisation ∆′ mapping a probabilistic game G : (X,S) −→
(Y,R) to a pure game ∆′(G) : (DX,DS) −→ (DY,DR) (using the double strength `, and D#(−)),
still with strategy set Σ∆′(G) = D(ΣG), extends to a functor ∆′ : GameProb → Game′Pure.
Determinisation ∆ itself is a functor if restricted to games whose coutility preserves
the D-algebra structure in a certain sense. One might hope that one of these functors
might have a left or a right adjoint, but this is too much to ask, since it would imply in
turn that D has both a left and a right adjoint. However, we show that the canonical
way to embed a pure game as a probabilistic game has a right adjoint.
Theorem 21 Let Θ : Game′Pure → GameProb be the functor that acts as the identity on the strategy
set and the lens structure, with EΘ(G) x k = {η(σ) | σ ∈ EG x k }. Then
GameProb Game′Pure
Ψ
22
Θrr
⊥
where Ψ : GameProb → Game′Pure similarly acts as the identity on the strategy set and the lens
structure, with EΨ(H) x k = {σ | η(σ) ∈ EH x k }.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a framework for compositional game theory which encompasses
also mixed strategies, and shown that it is closed under parallel and sequential com-
position, and shown that it can adequately model common games such as Matching
Pennies (where mixed strategies are crucial) and the Market Entry Game. We also
dened a notion of morphism between games, and showed that it gives rise to a cate-
gory of games that we that can be useful for reasoning, e.g. by employing adjunctions
between pure and probabilistic games.
Several challenges remain. While we have accurately captured mixed strategy Nash
equilibria — a fundamental solution concept in game theory — it remains to be seen
if this framework can exploit the non-independent distributions that arise naturally
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in it to capture also correlated equilibria or perhaps even evolutionary stable strategies.
Finally, we remark that most of our proofs do not use any particular properties of the
commutative monad D. We think this can be used to uniformly model other “eectful”
game-theoretic phenomena such as e.g. quitting games using the exceptions monad.
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